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Abstract
This article describes recent events in the governance of 
standard-setting for 2 areas of US health policy — states’ 
decisions about which prescription drugs to cover under 
Medicaid and other public programs and making health 
an aspect of foreign policy — and whether these events 
offer lessons for policy making. In prescription drug cov-
erage, methodologic advances in research that evaluates 
health services and the politics of restraining the rate of 
growth in health expenditures enabled policy makers in 
most states to establish new public processes for assessing 
and applying evidence about the effectiveness of compet-
ing drugs. Their counterparts in foreign policy, in contrast, 
made few changes in existing processes for choosing which 
interventions to support. The history of governance in each 
area of policy making for health explains the selection of 
standards to evaluate evidence about interventions and 
whether and how to use this evidence to guide policy.
Introduction
Government leaders at every level choose among alterna-
tive policies mainly as a result of governance. Researchers 
in the policy sciences (eg, history, politics, economics, law) 
describe  governance  as  encompassing  the  complex  rela-
tionships among people and organizations that influence 
the  making  and  implementing  of  policy.  Understanding 
governance requires analysis of the authority and account-
ability embodied in constitutions, laws, and regulations; the 
politics of professional, commercial, and advocacy groups; 
and  the  shaping  of  public  opinion.  Moreover,  ideas  and 
beliefs — some contested, others consensual — influence 
the governance of each area of policy. In sum, governance 
is the source of the “power to make, the willingness to obey, 
and the decisions to contest rules and commands” (1).
This article describes, compares, and seeks lessons from 
the effects on standard-setting of recent changes in the 
governance of health care policy in the states and of health 
as an aspect of American foreign policy. During the past 
decade,  almost  all  of  the  states  established  public  pro-
cesses to set standards for evaluating research findings on 
the effectiveness of pharmaceutical drugs, for adjudicating 
competing claims about the strength of the evidence for 
these findings, and for advising about or, in some jurisdic-
tions, recommending policy. In contrast, the events that 
raised the priority accorded to health as an aspect of for-
eign policy did not establish new processes that set stan-
dards for how the best available evidence would inform 
policy. As a result, the conventional governance of foreign 
policy set standards for which determinants of health to 
address and with what interventions.
History of the Governance of Population 
Health
Governance and the delegation of authority
Until recently, the governance of most countries’ juris-
dictions  resulted  in  the  authority  for  setting  standards 
for  health  policy  being  split  among  different  influential 
groups.  Public  officials  set  standards  for  investigating, 
measuring, and, if possible, acting to reduce the incidence 
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and  prevalence  of  disease  and  improve  the  safety  of 
patients in clinical facilities. In each country, governance 
determined  the  influence  of  the  best  available  research 
and lobbying by commercial, professional, and reformist 
interest groups on these standards.
Governance in most countries resulted in authority for 
science  being  delegated  to  communities  of  researchers. 
Researchers usually dominated the prioritization of sub-
jects for investigation and set standards for methodology 
and evidence. They governed science through professional 
associations,  national  academies  and  colleges,  universi-
ties, foundations, and government funding agencies. 
Governance also resulted in authority being delegated 
to the health professions. For centuries, physicians have 
had  legal  authority  to  license,  certify,  credential,  and 
discipline their colleagues. As a result of this authority, 
they  acquired  substantial  autonomy  beyond  what  had 
been legally granted to them to set and enforce standards 
for care. Physicians tenaciously protected this autonomy 
when,  during  the  20th  century,  governments  delegated 
more  limited  authority  to  other  health  professions  to 
license and discipline their members.
However, governance could not divide authority to make 
and implement policy to address determinants of health 
that involved physical infrastructure, personal behavior, 
and socioeconomic conditions. For example, since the 19th 
century, coalitions in the United States and other coun-
tries supported the allocation of considerable tax revenue 
for sewerage and the chlorination and filtration of water. 
By the early 20th century, investment in technologies to 
produce clean water was “responsible for nearly half the 
total mortality reduction, three quarters of the infant mor-
tality reduction, and nearly two thirds of the child mortal-
ity reduction [in] major American cities” (2).
Innovations in governance
Other  innovations  in  public  health  policy  occurred  as 
a result of governance that involved public agencies, the 
medical profession, and leaders of business, philanthropy, 
and labor. For example, international collaboration among 
researchers and public officials to define diseases in order 
to report and quantify cases began in the 1850s. By the 
end of that decade, William Farr, a British health official, 
had  devised  a  “model  healthy  population  to  serve  as  a 
standard” for calculating excess mortality among health 
districts (3). By the 1980s this concept, elaborated, had 
become  the  basis  of  the  European  Community  Atlas  of 
“Avoidable Death” (4).
By allocating resources to address other determinants 
of  population  health,  governance  facilitated  the  imple-
mentation of health care policy. Beginning in the 1850s, 
for  instance,  William  Farr  collaborated  with  Florence 
Nightingale in achieving policy to measure excess deaths 
in  public  and  charitable  hospitals.  Then  they  acquired 
resources to evaluate interventions to reduce excess mor-
tality by intervening in both the care of patients and the 
management  of  hospital  environments  (5).  Efforts  con-
tinue to persuade policy makers to link interventions with 
individuals and with populations. For example, a recent 
US study of avoidable deaths found that “health improve-
ment requires investment in . . . health care, behavioral 
change, and socioeconomic factors” (6).
Addressing multiple determinants of health in governance
Governance also has been mobilized to address multiple 
determinants of health. One of the earliest examples of 
this mobilization occurred in New York City in the 1890s 
when public health officials proposed mandatory report-
ing of tuberculosis, which the medical profession strongly 
opposed.  Then  the  city’s  political  machine,  Tammany 
Hall, along with leaders of business and philanthropy who 
usually opposed Tammany, endorsed mandatory report-
ing (7). Another example of the mobilization of governance 
to address multiple determinants of health occurred in 
many low- and middle-income countries from the 1920s 
through  the  1960s.  Public  officials  in  these  countries, 
often collaborating with leaders in business, labor, reli-
gion, and philanthropy, prioritized investment in raising 
standards for education and public health rather than for 
health care (8).
Governance in industrial countries frequently results in 
the prioritization of determinants of health other than care 
during  crises.  Until  the  mid-19th  century,  for  instance, 
hunger and its effects were not problems of governance. 
Prevailing belief ascribed hunger to individual misbehav-
ior  or  inexorable  natural  forces.  Governance  then  rede-
fined hunger as a problem caused by economic, social, and 
political circumstances. By the 1920s, scientific advances 
distinguished  starvation  from  malnutrition,  and  policy 
emerged to address both conditions. During World War II, 
a British official described the effects of public, civic, and VOLUME 7: NO. 6
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private activities to prevent starvation and malnutrition. 
He reported that the “people of this country are actually 
better fed today from the point of view of health than they 
were before the war” (9).
In each of the examples above, participants in governance 
had  incentives  to  address  determinants  of  population 
health.  Healthier  voters  enhanced  Tammany’s  political 
capital and were more productive employees. Policy mak-
ers and their allies in low- and middle-income countries 
built  schools  and  educated  their  citizens  about  manag-
ing  health  risks,  in  large  part  because  they  had  fewer 
resources than their counterparts in industrial countries. 
The  governance  of  wartime  Britain  strongly  endorsed 
food policy that maintained a productive workforce and 
contained class conflict.
Precedents also exist for standards that address mul-
tiple determinants of health in the governance of foreign 
policy. During the 1930s the League of Nations Health 
Organization promoted science-based standards for nutri-
tional  policy,  usually  collaborating  with  external  scien-
tific, professional, and philanthropic organizations. In the 
1950s,  leaders  of  philanthropic  foundations  and  public 
officials in the United States collaborated to expand the 
scope of foreign policy to include aid for family planning in 
low-income countries.
The Conventional Politics of Setting 
Standards for Health
In each of these examples, research findings on popula-
tion  health  informed  governance  through  conventional 
political  processes.  Researchers,  physicians  and  other 
health  professionals,  advocates  for  patients,  and  lobby-
ists for commercial interest groups published studies and 
polemics, informed journalists, testified to legislative com-
mittees,  visited  policy  makers,  and  contributed  to  their 
campaigns. Officials of national and subnational govern-
ments, multinational public organizations, philanthropies, 
and advocacy groups issued reports and promoted policies 
to set and raise standards for health.
Unanticipated consequences of these conventional mech-
anisms of governance impeded making policy to improve 
population  health.  Elected  officials  have  had  grounds 
for  skepticism  about  scientific  advice  given  to  them  by 
patients’ advocates, workers, members of racial and eth-
nic  minority  groups,  and  even  charitable  organizations, 
as well as from lobbyists for commercial and professional 
organizations. Policy makers have, for instance, often dis-
trusted advice from career scientists within government 
because these civil servants have frequently collaborated 
with  (and  subsequently  became  employees  of)  advocacy 
and  industrial  organizations  that  interpreted  scientific 
evidence in ways that promoted their self-interest (10).
Changes in Governance
Advances in research and evaluation methods
Despite  interest-group  lobbying  and  the  skepticism  of 
policy makers, science that met international standards of 
excellence has frequently been effective in the governance 
of population health policy. Examples include regulating 
lead in gasoline and paint, asbestos in building materials, 
and vinyl chloride as an industrial chemical (11) and limit-
ing exposure to secondhand tobacco smoke in public places 
and workplaces. In each of these instances, findings from 
research that was independent of commercial or ideological 
influence helped government officials persuade colleagues 
and constituents to support new regulations, even when 
these policies adversely affected the earnings of corpora-
tions and individuals and restricted personal liberty.
Advances  in  methods  for  evaluating  the  effectiveness 
of health services have influenced governance around the 
world since the early 1990s. These methods enabled policy 
makers  to  challenge  assertions  about  what  services  to 
pay for that were based mainly on claims of authority by 
medical professionals and sometimes on questionable evi-
dence promoted by commercial and advocacy groups. The 
most prominent example of this influence of research on 
governance is the methodology of research synthesis and 
its use to conduct systematic reviews of the effectiveness 
of prescription drugs, medical devices, care processes, and 
public health interventions. Authors of systematic reviews 
who accept international standards exclude the weakest 
and most biased primary studies and conduct meta-analy-
ses to minimize bias in studies they select for synthesis. 
The number of systematic reviews published each year in 
the international literature recently increased from 87 in 
1988 to an average of 2,500 in 2005 (12).
Methodologic advances that have increasing influence 
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decades.  New  methods  for  measuring  and  improving 
the quality of health care, work that was subsequently 
labeled quality science, evolved from the study of indus-
trial processes in the general economy and from general 
and  clinical  epidemiology.  Advances  in  the  methods  of 
economics increased the persuasiveness of cost-effective-
ness  analysis  and  created  new  approaches  to  studying 
social well-being and analyzing different forms of organi-
zational governance. Similarly, advances in the methods 
of political science, sociology, and historical epidemiology 
generated  findings  that  interest  some  key  participants 
in governance; for example, quantifying the relationship 
between changes in health care infrastructure and health 
status, educational attainment, and even the stability of 
regimes in low-income countries.
The new governance of evidence-informed standards
Recent innovations in the governance of health care in 
most industrial countries are assisting policy makers to 
counter  pressure  from  interest  and  advocacy  groups  in 
new ways. Policy makers have established organizations 
— sometimes called agencies, commissions, committees, 
councils,  or  institutes,  but  which  will  be  called  review 
organizations hereafter — that commission, conduct, and 
report on independent research that evaluates interven-
tions. These organizations usually recommend policy or 
issue guidance that has the force of law. The first review 
organizations assessed new interventions, especially those 
involving  drugs  and  devices,  but  their  scope  is  steadily 
expanding.  Review  organizations  are  led  by  experts  in 
health  research,  policy,  and  clinical  practice  or  appoint 
such experts to advisory groups (13).
Staff  of  these  organizations  often  share  experience 
across  national  and  subjurisdictional  boundaries.  As  a 
result of these exchanges, most of the organizations are 
applying internationally accepted standards for methods 
to evaluate drugs, devices, and care processes. Research 
from one country often supports a report under attack in 
another.
Review  organizations  dealing  with  the  governance  of 
health care have antagonists. Manufacturers of drugs and 
devices, the research and advocacy groups they finance, 
and  some  associations  of  medical  specialists  frequently 
challenge public and quasi-public organizations that eval-
uate health services. These critics often deplore decisions 
that  limit  coverage  to  the  most  effective  interventions. 
Many insist that analysis of cost-effectiveness masks deci-
sions to ration care.
The frequency and sophistication of these challenges has 
increased since the 1990s because of the rapid increase 
in  the  number  of  public,  quasi-public,  and  nonprofit 
organizations  that  use  evidence-based  health  research 
to  inform  their  recommendations.  This  growing  use  of 
evidence-based health research followed the advances in 
methodology  summarized  above.  These  advances  influ-
enced governance because they coincided with the dismay 
of many policy makers and employers about increasing 
expenditures  for  health  care.  The  first  project  to  use 
systematic reviews to evaluate an entire area of health 
services published its results in 1989 (14). The Cochrane 
Collaboration,  organized  in  1993,  has  established  an 
international  process  for  improving  the  standards  and 
methods of systematic reviews. It also created, enlarged, 
and sustained an international community of reviewers.
The standards set by most of the review organizations 
threaten  manufacturers  and  their  allies  in  the  supply 
chain, as well as many researchers, because they address 
sources  of  systematic  bias  in  conducting  and  reporting 
research.  For  example,  the  review  organizations’  stan-
dards for disclosing and avoiding conflict of interest are 
often higher than those of most universities and funders of 
primary studies. Many review organizations also require 
that  evidence  submitted  to  them  by  industry  be  made 
publicly available.
Despite considerable opposition, evidence is accumulat-
ing that policy created on the basis of the work of orga-
nizations that conduct and assess systematic reviews of 
prescription drugs and other interventions is improving 
the  quality  of  care  and  containing  growth  in  spending. 
The  application  of  science-based  regulatory  standards 
shifts market share, often drastically, to the most effective 
interventions.
Some public review organizations in the United States 
and other countries also evaluate interventions to prevent 
disease  and  address  determinants  of  health  other  than 
care. The United States Preventive Services Task Force 
systematically reviews evidence of effectiveness and issues 
recommendations.  The  Guide  to  Community  Preventive 
Services of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
commissions  systematic  reviews  of  interventions  to 
improve population health but does not recommend policy. VOLUME 7: NO. 6
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The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE)  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  published  public 
health “guidance” based on evidence reviews for interven-
tions that have recently included behavior change, com-
munity  engagement,  social  and  emotional  well-being  in 
primary education, and promoting physical activity. Policy 
makers have recently asked a few review organizations to 
recommend the reallocation of resources from ineffective 
services to address determinants of health other than care. 
Such public discussion has occurred — and generated con-
troversy in governance — in Australia, England, France, 
and Spain (15).
The  changes  in  governance  that  have  raised  eviden-
tiary standards for policy for health care and population 
health are a result of the gradual redistribution of power. 
Redistribution is occurring because of growing agreement 
on 2 points among many leaders of government, business, 
the health professions, and the media: 1) that the rate 
at which spending for health care has been increasing is 
unsustainable and 2) that much care is ineffective, unnec-
essary, or harmful. This agreement is reflected in changes 
in  governance  that  are  mitigating  political  barriers  to 
higher evidentiary standards for the coverage of health 
services  (eg,  the  sections  on  comparative  effectiveness 
research  in  Patient  Protection  and  Affordable  Care  Act 
of 2010 in the United States) (16,17). These barriers are, 
however, still daunting.
Standards for Health in the Governance of 
Foreign Affairs
Improving  health  has  become  a  funded  rather  than 
symbolic  goal  of  foreign  and  national  security  policy 
since the late 1990s. The US Central Intelligence Agency 
reported in 1998 that high infant mortality was a signifi-
cant predictor of the failure of states. During the second 
Clinton  Administration,  the  National  Security  Council 
for  the  first  time  assigned  a  staff  member  to  address 
issues in global health. In 2001, a new secretary of state, 
Colin  Powell,  appointed  the  first  assistant  secretary  of 
state  for  health.  Ambassadors  rather  than  aid  officials 
in  Washington  and  low-income  countries  administered 
the  President’s  Emergency  Program  for  AIDS  Relief 
(PEPFAR) enacted in 2003. A committee of the Institute 
of  Medicine  recommended  that  the  incoming  Obama 
administration “highlight health as a pillar of US foreign 
policy.”  The  United  States  and  other  donor  countries 
increased spending for health by more than 600% during 
the past 2 decades (18-20).
The  salience  of  health  as  an  aspect  of  foreign  affairs 
increased without changes in governance as substantial 
as those that have occurred in decision making for health 
care. Policy makers for health in foreign affairs and their 
allies outside government have often refused or been reluc-
tant to apply findings from research on the effectiveness of 
interventions. Some opposition to applying the findings of 
independent research is ideological (eg, advocates of absti-
nence-only  programs  to  prevent  HIV  infection)  or  com-
mercial (eg, resistance from pharmaceutical companies to 
purchasing generic drugs with PEPFAR funds).
Many experts on international health and their allies in 
government have also resisted applying the best available 
findings from research. Following are some examples from 
my  experience.  A  Washington-based  nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) appointed an internationally promi-
nent systematic reviewer as its director of research and 
then denied him access to its grant funds from the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation. Leaders of health-related 
NGOs  from  many  countries  opposed  a  recommendation 
by  a  work  group  of  the  Council  on  Foreign  Relations 
that  PEPFAR  take  account  of  findings  from  systematic 
reviews (21). The first administrator of PEPFAR in the 
US Department of State and the program’s chief physician 
met with the authors of the recommendation but declined 
to accept it. As a participant in these events, I speculated 
that this resistance to the best evidence was about pro-
tecting territory: for NGO leaders, access to and approval 
by funders in government and foundations; for PEPFAR 
officials,  to  avoid  collaborating  with  and  perhaps  fund-
ing federal agencies that sponsor research that evaluates 
interventions to improve health.
The World Health Organization (WHO) endorses sys-
tematic  reviews  but  has  been  ambivalent  about  using 
them to set standards for policy. WHO’s Model Lists of 
Essential  Medicines  and  its  program  on  maternal  and 
child health rely on reviews published by the Cochrane 
Collaboration.  However,  WHO  continues  to  recommend 
Directly Observed Therapy/Short Course (DOTS) for treat-
ing tuberculosis despite trials and systematic reviews that 
find it is not the most effective intervention (22).
Several countries and private organizations are, how-
ever, applying standards in global health similar to those VOLUME 7: NO. 6
NOVEMBER 2010
6  Centers for Disease Control and Prevention • www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2010/nov/10_0027.htm
The opinions expressed by authors contributing to this journal do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the US Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Public Health Service, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, or the authors’ affiliated institutions. Use of trade names is for identification only and 
does not imply endorsement by any of the groups named above.
that  are  becoming  conventional  in  the  governance  of 
domestic policy for health care. The chief medical officer 
of the Department of Health in the United Kingdom, for 
example,  leads  a  “government-wide  global  strategy”  for 
health that includes using the research and standard-set-
ting expertise of the National Health Service, the Health 
Protection Agency, and NICE (23,24). Similarly, leading 
foundations  and  multinational  organizations  in  global 
health evince increased interest in evidence from indepen-
dent research. The governance of health as an aspect of 
foreign affairs may be changing.
Conclusion
The use of evidence from research to set standards and 
inform policy has had a different history in health care, 
especially  in  making  decisions  about  coverage,  than  in 
health as an aspect of foreign policy. In health care, findings 
from research in laboratory, clinical, and community set-
tings have been prominent in governance of the allocation of 
resources and of accountability for more than a century.
In  the  governance  of  foreign  policy,  in  contrast,  find-
ings from formal research have almost always been sub-
ordinate  to  ideology,  commercial  interests,  and  threats 
to  international  and  homeland  security.  Participants  in 
governance  often  have  substantial  reasons  to  subsidize 
and placate leaders of countries that have dysfunctional 
health systems. Policy makers for health care, unlike their 
counterparts in foreign policy, work in the context of high 
public expectations that interventions will have measur-
able benefits for people and populations.
Proponents  of  science-based  standards  in  the  gover-
nance of both health care and health as a factor in foreign 
policy  have  experienced  less  resistance  to  establishing 
such standards for health services than for socioeconomic 
and  behavioral  determinants  of  health.  Evidence  has 
accumulated about the effects on health status of alter-
native policies for income maintenance, education, social 
services, and the environment. But improving health is 
hardly  ever  the  highest  priority  of  leading  participants 
in the governance of these areas of policy, at home or in 
other countries. Calculations of potential net improvement 
in population health status over time are likely to remain 
secondary to immediate economic and political concerns.
However, recent research on the economics of governance 
suggests that it is possible and desirable to make policy 
that addresses broad determinants of health and to do so 
for both domestic and foreign policy. In his presidential 
address to the American Economic Association in 2009, 
Avinash Dixit described the benefits of governance that 
promotes well-being in a country or region. Such gover-
nance  “enabl[es]  the  growth  of  income  and  globaliz[es] 
the enlargement and stability of the middle class.” These 
benefits justify higher standards for population health to 
inform “collective action” in the “provision of public goods 
and  the  control  of  public  ‘bads’”  (25).  Other  economists 
argue  that  effective  incentives  for  such  collective  goods 
exist “outside the standard private goods model” (26).
Moreover, evidence exists that policy has improved pop-
ulation health indirectly, thus avoiding some resistance 
to making changes in governance to set higher standards 
for interventions. For example, strong evidence exists that 
population health in industrial countries improved since 
the early 19th century, mainly as a result of increased 
public  spending  for  health,  housing,  and  social  services 
combined with taxes that encouraged capital investment 
and, by taxing consumption, discouraged behavior linked 
to poor health and premature death (27).
The history of governance in each of the areas of policy 
discussed in this article offers lessons for improving popu-
lation health. The lesson from the governance of health 
care is that governance can be politically feasible for policy 
makers to establish science-based standards for policy and 
create organizations to conduct and assess research effec-
tively. The lesson from the governance of foreign policy 
is that it can contribute to improving health even when 
it rejects standards on the basis of the best available evi-
dence. The broadest lesson from the analysis in this article 
is that governance, in all its complexity, is the principal 
determinant of policy.
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